Danish experts disagree with Danish Intelligence Services. Really?
Do their arguments hold up? (spoiler: No, they don't)
On February 11, the Danish Foreign Intelligence Service (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste) released an updated risk assessment titled "Opdateret vurdering af truslen fra Rusland mod Rigsfællesskabet." This report outlines the potential threats posed by Russia and presents scenarios regarding its capacity to engage militarily with neighboring countries following the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. The assessment identifies three primary scenarios:
Within approximately six months after the conclusion of combat operations in Ukraine, Russia could launch military actions against a neighboring country, likely a non-NATO member.
Within approximately two years, Russia could initiate a regional conflict against one or more NATO countries in the Baltic Sea region.
Within approximately five years, Russia could engage in a large-scale war against European NATO, assuming the United States remains uninvolved.
These scenarios are based on two key assumptions:
The United States does not intervene.
European NATO nations do not rearm at the same pace as Russia.
Expert Analysis and Criticism
A report published on DR.dk presents counterarguments from Danish experts Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Flemming Splidsboel, who challenge the intelligence assessment. While Splidsboel's views are briefly mentioned, the focus is on Jakobsen's analysis.
Peter Viggo Jakobsen's Perspective
Jakobsen questions the foundational assumptions of the intelligence report, stating:
"It is assumed that NATO has been burned down, so the Russians know that the United States will not come. And it is assumed that Europe has not spent money on weapons for a number of years," says Peter Viggo Jakobsen. "So if you believe in all that, you can also believe in the analysis. But if you don't believe it, the analysis won't work."
Jakobsen disagrees with the assumptions that:
The United States will not intervene.
Europe will not invest in rearmament.
He argues that European nations, particularly in light of concerns about a potential second Trump presidency, are likely to increase defense spending. However, he does not directly address the question of U.S. commitment to European security.
The Debate on European Rearmament
Jakobsen acknowledges that European defense budgets have increased in recent years. However, the intelligence report's assumption is not just about absolute increases but relative growth compared to Russia. Measuring "military capacity" is complex, as it involves more than just financial investment; it also depends on procurement efficiency and operational readiness.
Jakobsen notes that European nations do not need to match Russian defense budgets one-to-one due to their larger GDPs. Even a smaller percentage increase in defense spending relative to GDP would result in a greater absolute budget. However, this overlooks the issue of purchasing power parity (PPP). Defense spending in Russia is more cost-effective due to factors such as:
Lower soldier salaries, allowing a greater share of the budget to be allocated to equipment.
Cheaper military equipment, although European technology is generally superior.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) highlights this discrepancy in its "Military Balance" report, cited by the Financial Times:
"Total Russian defense spending soared last year by 42 percent in real terms to Rbs13.1tn. That is equivalent to $462bn on the basis of purchasing power parity... European defense budgets, including the UK and EU member states, rose almost 12 percent last year to $457bn."
This indicates that despite Europe's economic strength, Russia is effectively outspending the EU and UK on military procurement.
The Political Will to Rearm
The crucial factor in European rearmament is political will. While financial resources exist—as evidenced by the EU's rapid allocation of €500 billion for COVID-19 measures in 2020—the capacity to scale up military production remains limited. However, this is a solvable issue given sufficient investment and commitment.
Currently, Europe is not rearming at the same rate as Russia. While Poland and the Baltic states have significantly increased defense spending, other key European nations have not followed suit. For instance:
Germany's "Zeitenwende" initiative has seen limited action.
France, Italy, and the UK have made only modest increases in defense production.
Major projects, such as the Danish ammunition factory planned in 2022, have yet to commence construction.
Putin's Intentions
Jakobsen also questions Russia's strategic motivations, arguing:
"Peter Viggo Jakobsen also finds it difficult to see what Russia's interest should be in starting a large-scale war in Europe. Even if NATO should not exist. 'And if NATO does not exist, Russia's concern for the United States is also gone,' he says. 'But with all these assumptions, the world is so much different that it is difficult to know what Russia will think in such a situation.'"
However, historical precedent suggests that Russia's geopolitical ambitions are rooted in territorial expansion. Despite being officially termed the "Russian Federation," modern Russia functions as a continuation of the Russian Empire. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia has "no borders," and Russian politicians have openly expressed desires to reclaim former territories, including the Baltic states.
Jakobsen's view that Russia lacks strategic incentives for war may overlook broader imperial ambitions. Analysts such as Mike Kofman and Anders Puck Nielsen interpret the Ukraine conflict as a struggle over European security architecture rather than a dispute over NATO or limited territory.
Jakobsen's credibility has been questioned due to his 2022 claim, made just days before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, that "the invasion was canceled" because Putin had already achieved his objectives, indicating that Jakobsen has not fully understood Putin’s ambitions or objectives.
U.S. Commitment to Europe
The article briefly addresses concerns about U.S. commitment to NATO, quoting Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen:
"I hope we can maintain a strong American commitment to Europe and to NATO. It is also in the interest of the Americans, I think."
"I have no knowledge that the Americans would be interested in leaving Europe alone," he adds, while acknowledging that the U.S. will likely demand greater European contributions.
This statement suggests that European security strategy is based more on hope than concrete assurances. The prevailing approach appears to be increasing European purchases of American military equipment to ensure continued U.S. engagement. However, given Europe's larger GDP and population compared to the U.S., a more self-reliant strategy would be preferable to depending on American political stability.
Conclusion
The Danish intelligence report presents a stark assessment of Russia's future military threats. Experts such as Peter Viggo Jakobsen challenge its core assumptions but their arguments overlook critical economic and strategic realities. The debate ultimately hinges on Europe’s political will to rearm and whether it can overcome structural and procurement challenges to ensure its security independently of the United States.